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Introduction
In many circumstances, the coexistence of long-lived economic and political elites is blamed for countries' low rate of technological innovation and economic growth. Through longlasting personal relations, contacts and acquaintances ("knowing the right person in the right place"), the sociopolitical network between politicians and economic actors tends to create a stable elite that rules the country, preventing the access to power by more dynamic individuals. Although a (possibly negative) relationship between perpetuation of political and economic power and innovation is often mentioned in policy debates, neither a wellestablished economic theory nor convincing empirical evidence are available to support this view.
To formally address these issues, in this paper we empirically investigate whether the Italian local political environment, in particular the persistence of the same persons in the local political institutions, a¤ects private …rms'propensity to innovate. By concentrating on a single country, we avoid concerns emerging when countries with very di¤erent institutional settings are put together in cross-country analysis. Yet, information on Italian politicians is available at the local level, including municipality level, thus potentially providing substantial spatial variation in measures of persistence of politicians. Moreover, the insu¢ cient replacement of power elite is often considered to be among the causes of Italy's economic decline. As Carboni [8] puts it, "Italy is falling behind and the unconcern of our elites about our future is probably the consequence of the obsolescence of the country and of our circles of power ruled by a gerontocratic core" (page 6, our translation).
We …rst construct a measure of political persistence in Italian municipalities, where persistence is de…ned as the average longevity in o¢ ce of individuals appointed in local political institutions over a given period, from 1985 to 2007, the longest time span available, or a sub-period. Our measure of persistence considers the pool of politicians of a municipality as the entity with which …rms interact, rather than focusing on the individual connection between a …rm and a politician, as it the case in the literature about the impact of political connections on …rms'economic performance (see for instance Faccio [15] ).
Being based on individual data on political careers, our measure also di¤ers signi…cantly from proxies for political stability that have been previously used in the literature (see for example Alesina et al. [1] ). We then merge these political data with socioeconomic data that include, among others, relevant information on the location and innovation activity of Italian small and medium enterprises for a total of about 12.000 observations in the period 1998-2006.
Using this detailed dataset, we perform a cross-sectional analysis where the probability of process innovation is related to political persistence in the municipality where the …rm is located. Due to the spurious correlation between our two main variables, we estimate the model by instrumental variables, using the unexpected death of politicians in a municipality as a source of exogenous variation in political persistence.
The main result of our empirical analysis is that, when we consider process innovation, the innovation activity of …rms located in a municipality is negatively a¤ected by the average length in o¢ ce of local politicians. More speci…cally, our instrumental variables estimates suggest that a six months increase in politicians' average longevity lowers the probability of process innovation by 15%, including province …xed e¤ects and other controls at the municipality and …rm level. Moreover, we …nd that older …rms are more a¤ected by political persistence than younger ones, and that the impact of political persistence is slightly stronger for …rms that operate in industries heavily dependent on the public sector. Finally, when product innovation is considered rather than process innovation, the negative e¤ect of political persistence vanishes.
In principle, political longevity has ambiguous e¤ects on innovation. On the one hand, a stable political environment may reduce uncertainty regarding future policy choices thereby increasing the expected return from long-term investment and innovation. On the other hand, by exploiting long-term connections with politicians, …rms may enjoy preferential treatment in terms of lower burden of administrative costs, easier access to credit and production factors (e.g. public utilities) and public procurement. 1 These advantages may generate rents for incumbent …rms, reducing their incentive to innovate to upgrade technologies and increase productivity in order to maintain their competitive position.
Our empirical …ndings, which support a negative impact of political persistence on the probability of process innovation are consistent with the latter view. In a related theoretical paper (see Bellettini, Berti Ceroni and Prarolo [3] ) we put forward a possible explanation for such negative relationship, whereby entrepreneurs might choose to invest in time-consuming political connections, aimed at curbing bureaucratic costs, rather than spend resources to innovate. In this framework, political persistence makes investment in political connections pro…table for …rms and reduces the incentive to innovate.
Our paper is related to various strands of literature. First, it belongs to the literature on the external determinants of …rms'innovation activity, where the external determinant 1 There is evidence that managers spend a sizable fraction of their working time in meeting with politicians. Boeri et al. [5] , using a survey on Italian CEOs, …nd that the fraction of working time they spend with politicians (7%) is comparable with the time spent in dealing with banks.
we take into consideration is individual persistence in local political institutions. Many contributions in this literature focus, instead, on the availability of credit, showing that a well functioning, competitive banking system and the physical proximity of banks positively a¤ect …rms'innovation activity (see, among others, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi [6] , King and Levine [19] and Guiso et al. [18] ). In particular, our empirical approach borrows from the one developed by Benfratello et al. [4] who, using previous waves of the same data on Italian …rms, investigate the e¤ect of local banking development, measured by the number of bank branches per capita in a province, on …rms' innovation activity.
Beside focusing on a completely di¤erent external determinant (political persistence rather than …nancial development), which involves the development of a new instrument speci…c to our key explanatory variable, we have a …ner spatial de…nition of the local environment, at municipality, rather than province level. This allows us to control for province-speci…c …xed e¤ects (which may also capture banking development at province level) when we investigate the e¤ect of our main explanatory variable.
Second, from a macroeconomic perspective, a large theoretical and empirical literature, surveyed in Carmignani [9] , suggests a positive link between governments' term length (political stability) and economic growth, as instability and the threat of changes in the legislative environment make …rms less willing to invest. Most of these studies rely on measures of political instability based on revolutions, coups and assassinations, or the frequency of government turnover, which are very di¤erent from ours, based on individual data on the length of political careers.
Third, some contributions have used measures of political persistence similar to ours to investigate di¤erent issues. Coviello and Gagliarducci [12] show that mayors'longevity in o¢ ce in Italian municipalities negatively a¤ects the e¢ ciency of public procurement, as the number of bidders of an auction and the winning rebate decrease, while the probability that the winning …rm is an insider and that the contract is ex-post renegotiated increase with longevity. Using cross-country data, Campante et al. [10] investigate the relationship between corruption and political stability, measured as the average tenure of chief executives and governing parties over a given period. Their empirical …ndings show that corruption tends to increase with stability in relatively stable environments, as the prospect of long-term deals with the politicians raises …rms'willingness to involve in bribing and rent-seeking activities.
Finally, a growing literature studies the e¤ect of political connections on …rms'performance. Using Italian data, Cingano and Pinotti [13] look at the private returns and social costs of politically connected …rms matching data on Italian …rms'employees and politi-cians. De…ning a …rm as connected if a politician is among its employees, they quantify the gain from political connection in a 5% increase in revenues, obtained through changes in domestic sales and not through exports or productivity enhancements. Using international data, Faccio [15] and Faccio et al. [16] highlight that whenever …rms are owned or managed by politicians (or their friends and relatives), their market value increases and they are signi…cantly more likely to be bailed out than similar non-connected …rms. 2 Desai and Olofsgard [14] investigate the consequences of political connections on about 10.000 …rms surveyed in 40 developing countries and …nd that in ‡uential …rms face fewer administrative and regulatory burdens and invest and innovate less.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and Section 3 presents our empirical strategy and estimation results. Section 4 concludes.
Data
To construct our dataset we use two main sources of information, the historical archive of local administrators of the Italian Ministry of Internal A¤airs and waves eight, nine and ten of the Observatory over Small and Medium Enterprises, that have been produced by Capitalia (the …rst two) and UniCredit. Other data come from the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
Municipality-level data
Our source of information for political variables is the historical archive of local administrators of the Italian Ministry of Internal A¤airs. This archive records yearly, between 1985 and 2007, and for each municipality (8095 in 2007), data on mayors (sindaci ), councilmen (consiglieri ) and members of the executive committee (assessori ).
The mayor and councilmen are elected and the mayor appoints the members of the executive committee (giunta). 3 In municipalities with less than 15000 inhabitants (90% of the total) members of the executive committee can be chosen among councilmen, while the two roles are incompatible in municipalities with more than 15000 inhabitants. Both the giunta, i.e. the executive power, and the council, i.e. the legislative power, play a role 2 The unexpected death of politicians has been used as a source of exogenous changes in political connections of …rms by Faccio and Parsley [17] and Roberts [22] . Our instrumental variable strategy is inspired by these contributions. 3 Electoral rules concerning the election of the mayor were changed in 1993. The mayor was appointed by the winning party or coalition before, while he has been directly elected by citizens afterwards. Elections took place every …ve years for most of the time span under analysis.
in setting and enforcing regulation that may a¤ect …rms' activities. According to Law Decree n.267/2000, which collects laws ruling local administrations, their tasks include the concession of public utilities, setting the rules of agreements for private provision of public goods, designing the rules to which public utilities have to comply, organizing and supervising tenders, ruling and deciding upon building permits, among others.
For each politician, we have information regarding name, surname, date of birth, position held (sindaco/consigliere/assessore and role within the institution), dates of election, appointment and resignation. The cause of resignation is also available. Using these data, we build measures of political persistence P ERS Y 1 Y 2 for each municipality, where P ERS Y 1 Y 2 is de…ned as the average number of years spent within local political institutions by politicians of a municipality in the period Y 1 Y 2. More speci…cally, for each individual (uniquely de…ned by his name, surname and birth date) we sum the length of appointments served in the given period within a municipality and then take the average over all individuals that served in that municipality. Taking politicians'longevity in o¢ ce as a measure of in ‡uence on municipality's economic life, here we are possibly identifying a lower bound. In fact, although politicians exit the sample once they are appointed at province, regione or country level, their in ‡uence on local issues may be even higher.
Moreover, before or after being appointed in political institutions, individuals may be employed as bureaucrats in municipal apparatuses, or in …rms owned or controlled by the municipality, where connections with the productive sector are also possible.
Descriptive statistics for P ERS 1985 2007 and P ERS 1985 2000 are collected in Table 1 . 4 The variable P ERS 1985 2007 exploits all available information, as it considers the longest time span covered by the data. In the empirical analysis, however, our main variable of interest will be P ERS 1985 2000 , which has the advantage of being largely predetermined with respect to …rm-speci…c variables. We also calculate P ERS 1994 2007 , as 1993 represents an important breaking point in Italian politics. 5 The number of municipalities for which data are available is 7652, as we exclude municipalities that disappeared merging 4 Statistics for P ERS1994 2007 are not reported as this variable turns out to be very highly correlated with P ERS1985 2007 (0.994) and no sizeable di¤erences exist. The very high correlation between these two variables could be driven by lack of information on politicians in the …rst years of data. As long as the under-report of politicians is random, there are no issues of distortion in the estimates. 5 As already noted, electoral rules changed in 1993. Moreover, following a series of inquisitions conducted in 1992 and 1993 (generally referred to as "Mani Pulite") and scandals that uncovered a widespread system of corruption between entrepreneurs and politicians at all institutional levels ("Tangentopoli"), the political parties that had been previously ruling Italian politics collapsed, leading to the end of the so called "First is the average length in o¢ ce of politicians in each municipality, these numbers indicate a non-negligible variance across municipalities. P ERS 1985 2007 is higher in municipalities with population smaller that 15000 inhabitants, as expected due to the aforementioned law, lower in capital cities of provinces and regions (this is likely to be a size e¤ect since capital cities are on average larger than other municipalities), and higher in the North. 6 The last two rows of Table 1 report descriptive statistics once the sample is split in two sub-samples, according to whether at least one politician aged 60 or less died in a municipality in the period 1990-2005 (DEATH=1) or not (DEATH=0). As we will explain later, we will use death of a relatively young politician as a source of exogenous variation of political persistence. The di¤erence between the mean values of P ERS 1985 2007 in the two sub-samples is around three months and is statistically signi…cant, with municipalities where at least one death occurred showing lower mean. Table 1 also reports statistics for P ERS 1985 2000 , which is generally higher than P ERS 1985 2007 , indicating a decline in the length of political careers in recent years. As before the mean value is lower in municipalities where at least one death event occurred in the 1990-2005 period. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for other municipalities' variables that will be used in the empirical analysis, namely labor force participation rate (LF P R), population (P OP ), the elderly index, i.e. the share of inhabitants aged 65 or more (ELD_IN DEX), and the share of foreigners (SH_F OR). Data for these variables come from the 2001 Census. As a proxy for local human capital (T ERT _EDU ), we take the share of workers with tertiary education measured within Local Systems of Labor (these are 686 entities that group contiguous municipalities according to commuting patterns of workers). 7 Table 3 reports pairwise correlations. As expected, P ERS 1985 2007 and P ERS 1985 2000 are (weakly) negatively correlated with population and with the binary variable DEAT H.
Notice that DEAT H is positively correlated with population, as a larger population of politicians implies a larger probability of having at least one death event. 6 A visual inspection of Figure 1 shows that P ERS1985 2007, besides being higher in the North, is also higher at higher altitudes, as in the Alps and Appennines. 7 A detailed list of variables is available in the Appendix.
Firm-level data
The …rm-level information we use come from waves eight, nine and ten of the Observatory (1998-2000, 2001-2003, and 2004-2006) . In each wave the sample is selected (partly) with a strati…ed method for …rms with up to 500 workers, whereas …rms above this threshold are all included. Each survey contains, respectively, 4680, 4289 and 5137 manufacturing …rms and some of them are interviewed more than once (in particular 2480 are interviewed twice and 451 three times).
Around four in ten …rms introduced process innovation (IN N _P ROC), which will be our main dependent variable. In our view, process innovation is a better proxy for the cost-saving and/or productivity enhancements of …rms, which may be in ‡uenced by connections with local politicians. Instead, product innovation is more likely to be linked to demand-pull factors, such as the demand for new goods associated with exports (see Becker and Egger [2] for a discussion). In the empirical analysis, we will also use data on other …rms'characteristics from the same surveys, such as the total number 
The dataset
The dataset that we will use to perform our empirical analysis was obtained by merging municipalities' data with …rms' data, according to the municipality where a …rm is located. 8 We trimmed the sample at the …rst and last percentiles of turnover, innovation expenditure, number of employees and P ERS 1985 2007 to exclude outliers. We also excluded …rms not operating in manufacturing, together with those located in municipalities that experienced at least one period of special administration. 9 8 Some concerns may arise about the endogenous strategic location of …rms. However, we believe that …rms' locations are not primarily driven by the municipality-level determinants that we are mainly interested in, and in particular by political persistence. Michelacci and Silva [20] report that roughly 80%
of Italian entrepreneurs locate their …rms in the same province where they were born. 9 Under special administration, a non-elected administrator is appointed by the central government until new elections take place. This may happen because of resignation of the mayor, ma…a in…ltrations,
Between one fourth and one third of Italian municipalities host at least one …rm interviewed in the surveys (see Figure 2 ), with 2353 municipalities represented in the dataset.
On average there are …ve …rms for each municipality, but …rms'distribution is not homogeneous. Around 27% of the municipalities host only one …rm, the median value is three …rms, 25% of the municipalities host more than …ve …rms, and four municipalities (Rome, Prato, Turin and Milan) host 975 …rms together. Average population of the municipalities in the dataset is around 15500, which is larger than the average in the full sample (7200), con…rming that …rms tend to settle in larger municipalities.
Descriptive statistics for our dataset are collected in Table 4 . Process innovation takes place in 41% of the observations. The average age of …rms is 28, the vast majority of them (94%) is a corporation, and the entity controlling the …rm is a person in 71% of the cases.
In the lower panel of the Table, we report some descriptive statistics for municipalities' variables in the dataset. Capital cities, which are larger than average, are over-represented in the sample: more than 21% (10%) of the …rms are located in provincial (regional) for the three waves pooled together, given the intrinsically time-invariant nature of our measures of persistence. Our key explanatory variable will be P ERS 1985 2000 , which has the advantage of being largely predetermined with respect to innovation activity between 1998 and 2006.
Before proceeding, let us discuss whether a simple linear regression of innovation activity on local political persistence would deliver reliable results in terms of causality.
Clearly, many other factors, external or internal to the …rm, play a role in determining …rms'propensity to innovate, and will be considered in our analysis. However, our main concern is the likely presence of unobservables that could simultaneously a¤ect …rms'in- In order to tackle endogeneity and omitted variables issues, we will estimate the model by 2SLS. The proposed instrument is a dummy variable taking value one (zero) if at least one (no) politician aged 60 or less died in a municipality in the considered period.
Although we can not directly test for exogeneity of the instrument, death of at least one politician appointed in a municipality should impact on process innovation only through political persistence. Whether the instrument is relevant is an empirical issue. The e¤ect on political persistence of death of a politician may be negligible if he/she is replaced by someone already serving in another role (as it may be more likely in municipalities with less than 15000 inhabitants) or who was in o¢ ce before. Thus, we tried several …rst stage regressions using dummies for death events calculated over di¤erent time intervals and selected as instrument death calculated over the 1995-2000 period, which turned out to 1 1 The idea that economic outcomes may a¤ect electoral outcomes can be traced back to theoretical contributions by Rogo¤ and Sibert [24], Rogo¤ [23] and Persson and Tabellini [21] , among others. According to Brender and Drazen [7] , such e¤ects are not so clearly supported by empirical evidence, however.
be signi…cantly associated with our measures of political persistence. 12 The general speci…cation of our model is the following:
with …rst stage:
where i indicates …rms, X i is a vector that, depending on speci…cations, includes region (20 regions) and province (103 provinces) dummies, to capture determinants of innovation activity related to institutional characteristics which are common across municipalities belonging to such entities (including, for example, banking development in the province of residence, which has been found to positively a¤ect …rms'process innovation by Benfratello et al. [4] ), dummies for the sector of activity (23 sectors), and wave dummies.
In some speci…cations, we include further proxies that control for the local environment at municipality level, such as the elderly index, the share of foreigners, labor force participation rate, the share of workers with tertiary education, altitude, a polynomial in P OP to take into account population-related e¤ects 13 , a set of dummies for population size, P OP < 3K, 3K < P OP < 10K, 10K < P OP < 30K, 30K < P OP < 100K, 100K < P OP < 250K, 250K < P OP < 1M , P OP > 1M , chosen to match the discontinuous changes in the number of councilmen occurring at these thresholds as ruled by law, a dummy taking value one (zero) for municipalities with more (less) than 15000 inhabitants, and dummies indicating the semesters in which elections took place. 14 Among …rms'characteristics, we consider the (log) number of employees, (log) turnover, the share of workers employed in R&D, age, dummies indicating whether the …rm declares to be a corporation, to be part of a business group, to be controlled by a person, to be an exporter, and whether it made use of temporary workers. We also use dummies indicating whether the …rm operates in a high tech-sector or in a sector strongly dependent on public demand. For the latter two variables, our classi…cation follows Benfratello et al [4] and Cingano and Pinotti [13] , respectively. 15 1 2 In particular, death calculated over the 1990-1995 (1990-1995 1 3 Population may also proxy for the level of development as data for GDP at municipality level are not avilable. 1 4 As expected, these population-related controls turn out ot to be highly signi…cant in the …rst stage.
As …rms'decisions, for example regarding location, are not exogenous to municipality size, they could not be used as excluded instruments. 1 5 A detailed list of variables and their de…nition is provided in the Appendix. Table 6 reports the estimated coe¢ cient for our key explanatory variables obtained under di¤erent speci…cations of the model. In all cases, reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. We also provide estimation results (in parenthesis) obtained by clustering standard errors at municipality level, the dimension along which political persistence varies.
Estimation results
We …rst estimate (1) by OLS, including among regressors only region, wave and semester dummies, together with a dummy indicating whether the municipality is a capital city. As shown in column (1) signi…cant at conventional levels.
In column 5, we replace region with province dummies, and start to add proxies of …rms' characteristics. We …rst include …rms' characteristics that are less likely to be endogenous to innovation activity, such as the log number of employees, age, dummies indicating whether the …rm is controlled by a person, belongs to a business group, is a In Table 7 we report results obtained using alternative measures of political persistence and instruments as robustness checks, taking the model's speci…cations that include municipality variables (column 4, Table 6 ) and some …rms'characteristics (column 5, that is the number of politicians aged 60 or less dead in a municipality divided by the average number of politicians in o¢ ce in the 1995-2000 period. 19 Even if more accurate in 1 8 In this speci…cation the estimated e¤ect of the share of labor force in R&D is positive and highly signi…cant, while the coe¢ cient of the high-tech dummy becomes negative. This may be due to the positive correlation between these variables. 1 9 When DEAT H1995 2000 is used, even if we control for the size of municipalities by including population dummies and the population polynomial, we attribute the same average e¤ect of a death event on political 
Di¤erential responses to political persistence and alternative dependent variables
We believe that our results so far provide robust evidence that local political persistence determines a negative impact on …rms' innovation activities leading to productivity improvements, after controlling for …xed institutional features at region and province level, the economic environment at the municipality level, and …rms'characteristics. The e¤ect is sizable, as our point estimates indicate that an increase in average political longevity in the municipality by one standard deviation reduces the probability of process innovation by 20-30% (depending on the measure of political persistence). In particular, according to estimates obtained in our preferred speci…cation (column 5, Table 6 ), a six months increase in average political longevity reduces the probability that a …rm located in the municipality innovates by 15%. As discussed in the Introduction, this …nding is consistent with a negative e¤ect of political stability on …rms'propensity to invest in innovation to increase productivity. This may be due to the fact that, by exploiting political connections with stable politicians, …rms may reduce the incidence of bureaucratic and administrative costs and remain competitive even if they do not upgrade their technologies (see Bellettini, Berti Ceroni and Prarolo [3] for a theoretical model developing this view) or may obtain preferential treatment in public procurement or other activities controlled by local politicians.
In order to further investigate the relationship between political persistence and innovation activity, we consider alternative speci…cations of our model. First, we allow for the possibility of di¤erential e¤ects of political persistence on process innovation, depending on …rms' characteristics, such as age and sector of activity, that may determine the importance of stability of the political elite for the …rm. For example, older …rms may used, the number of death events is normalized by the number of politicians in each municipality, so that the coe¢ cient in the …rst stage represents the change of persistence (in number of years) if all the politicians had to die contemporaneously, under the assumption that tenure is the same for all politicians.
have established stronger connections with politicians and therefore be more a¤ected by political persistence than younger …rms. Also, the value of political connections and the e¤ect of political persistence may be higher for …rms operating in industries highly dependent on the public sector. Next, we consider alternative dependent variables, such as product innovation, …rms' turnover and size. Product innovation may be mainly determined by demand-driven external factors una¤ected by the local environment and the average longevity in o¢ ce of politicians. Instead, the latter may in ‡uence pro…tability and therefore measures of …rms'performance, such as turnover and size.
We start by testing for di¤erential responses to political persistence by including interaction terms in the model's speci…cation with municipality and …rm-level variables (Column 5, Table 6 ). We investigate …rst the e¤ect of …rms'age by introducing two interaction terms where P ERS 1985 2000 is multiplied by two dummy variables, taking value one when the …rm is younger or older than 15 years, respectively. In the …rst stage, the interactions of DEAT H 1995 2000 with the two dummies are used as instruments. 20 As shown in column 1, Table 8 , the estimated coe¢ cient of P ERS 1985 2000 for young …rms is not di¤erent from zero, while for old …rms it is negative and signi…cant at 5% con…dence level. 21 2 1 The Wald test for di¤erent coe¢ cients is not signi…cant at conventional level: the con…dence level is only 16%. 2 2 The Wald test for di¤erent coe¢ cients is signi…cant only at 12% con…dence level. 2 3 In their study of the e¤ect of local banking development on …rms' innovative activities, Benfratello tence, which is signi…cant at 10% level (column 4). Occupation (LOG_OCC), another measure of …rm size, is not signi…cantly related to P ERS 1985 2000 (column 5).
Overall, these results suggest that the negative in ‡uence of political persistence on the probability of process innovation is more important in older …rms and (even if slightly) in …rms operating in industries that mainly serve the public sector, where political connections are likely to be stronger and more widespread. Moreover, political persistence, which negatively a¤ects the probability of process innovation, has no e¤ects on product innovation, and positive e¤ect (if any) on …rms'market performance. Although they are based on a completely di¤erent approach, these …ndings can be considered complementary to those of Cingano and Pinotti [13] , who provide evidence that political connections, measured by the presence of local politicians among employees, grant Italian …rms a premium in terms of revenues, which is not related to improvements in productivity, and is driven by …rms operating in sectors that most intensively provide inputs to the public administrations.
Conclusion
The political and economic environment in which a …rm operates is crucial in shaping its innovation activity. In this paper we investigate whether longevity in o¢ ce of administra- Our estimates support a sizable negative e¤ect of political persistence on the probability of process innovation which is robust to the inclusion of …rm and municipality-level controls and several dummies, including province and region …xed e¤ects. There is also some evidence that the negative impact of political persistence on innovation is stronger et al. [4] …nd that the evidence of such e¤ect is weaker when product innovation, rather than process innovation, is considered.
in older …rms and …rms operating in industries that mainly serve the public sector, and that political persistence has positive e¤ect on …rms'market performance, as measured by turnover.
These …ndings are consistent with the view that political stability may reduce …rms' incentive to increase productivity, possibly as it allows …rms to establish and exploit connections with long-tenured politicians and to obtain preferential treatment in domains of economic activity controlled by local administrators.
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Firm-level variables
Source: Observatory over Small and Medium Enterprises, Capitalia, waves 8 and 9, and Unicredit, wave 10.
AGE : age of the …rm.
COM : full name of municipality in which the …rm is located, coded from ISTAT.
D_EXPORT : dummy taking value of one if the …rm declared to export a positive share of the production in the period covered by the survey (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) SOC_CAP : dummy taking value one if the …rm declared to be a corporation in the period covered by the survey (1998-2000, 2001-2003, and 2004-2006) .
TURNOVER: turnover in the …rst year of the survey.
